Brazil

General overview

The area of freedom of expression and the right to social protest in the Brazilian case during this period presents events of a positive nature worth highlighting. Press freedom shows verifiable and internationally recognized improvements compared to the situation under the Bolsonaro government. Moreover, as noted for each set of rights, we observe an active and mobilized civil society in the face of situations perceived as attacks or threats to rights already won or still being fought for.

Advances in press freedom

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the Lula government normalized relations between the State and the press after four years of systematic hostility under the Bolsonaro government. In the RSF 2024 index, Brazil improved its position with concrete advances in press freedom protection and fulfillment of transparency commitments. In May 2025, Brazil rose to 63rd place in the RSF 2025 World Press Freedom Index, climbing 47 positions since 2022, and was highlighted as an exceptional case on a continent where 22 out of 28 countries regressed. As contextual data, the FENAJ 2024 Report documented a proportional increase in judicial harassment of journalists — from 13.81% to 15.97% — with 38.9% of cases occurring during the municipal election campaign. This trend indicates that advances in the institutional environment do not eliminate more diffuse harassment practices that persist in the judicial and political system.

The right to social protest / Civil society resistance

The June 2024–June 2025 period recorded an active and mobilized civil society on multiple fronts.

In defense of sexual and reproductive rights: The most immediate and massive social response of the period came in June 2024, when the Chamber of Deputies approved Bill 1904/2024 — which equated abortion from week 22 onwards with simple homicide — in just 23 seconds. Mobilizations took place in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília in rejection of the measure. This social pressure contributed to the bill never being implemented. In March 2025, on International Women’s Day, thousands of women marched in the country’s main cities against femicide, for the decriminalization of abortion, and for more resources for gender policies, in a context of record femicide figures in 2024.

In defense of labor rights: The period recorded trade union and labor protest activity of notable scale. In November 2024, large-scale mobilizations across the country placed the 6×1 working schedule — the regime of 6 consecutive working days with 1 day of rest, implying up to 44 hours per week and particularly affecting workers in commerce, services, and healthcare — at the center of debate. These mobilizations had a direct legislative impact: in February 2025, Representative Erika Hilton (PSOL-SP) introduced PEC No. 8/2025 to eliminate the 6×1 schedule, backed by 234 lawmakers’ signatures and nearly 3 million citizens’ signatures. In March 2025, gig workers in several cities halted activities for two days demanding a minimum rate of R$ 10 per delivery. On May 1, 2025, the trade union federations delivered to President Lula the “Workers’ Class Agenda 2025,” with demands including the regulation of app-based work, reduction of working hours without salary reduction, restoration of retirees’ purchasing power, and the end of the 6×1 schedule.

In defense of indigenous peoples’ rights: In June 2024, the 20th edition of the Acampamento Terra Livre was held in Brasília under the motto “Indigenous Emergency: Our Rights Are Non-Negotiable,” bringing together thousands of indigenous people who marched along the Esplanada dos Ministérios in defense of their territorial rights.

General overview

The area of sexual and reproductive rights is the densest of the Brazilian period, both in the number of events and in the complexity of the picture it presents. The federal executive advanced significantly in LGBTQIA+ rights, in the fight against femicide, and in the construction of a National Care Policy. At the same time, Congress and actors within the judicial system — with support from the medical establishment — generated setbacks and threats that the government had to contest through the courts. This dynamic of simultaneous advance and resistance is the most characteristic feature of the Brazilian case with regard to this set of rights.

LGBTQIA+ rights, care, and the anti-femicide agenda

From the start of the period, the federal government maintained an active LGBTQIA+ rights agenda. In June 2024, the Acolher+, Empodera+, and Bem Viver+ programs were launched, with investment exceeding R$ 8 million, aimed at guaranteeing labor inclusion and shelters for LGBTQIA+ people living on the streets. On the same date, the government signed a technical cooperation agreement with Fundacentro for the implementation of Empodera+. Additionally, the National Council of Justice and the federal government signed an agreement to implement the Rogéria Form, an emergency registration system for LGBTQIA+ people at risk. In January 2025, the National Agenda for Combating Violence against LGBTQIA+ People was launched, with federal intersectoral actions. In February 2025, more than 21,000 people participated in state-level preparatory conferences for the 4th National LGBTQIA+ Conference, which was held in October of that year and was convened by presidential decree.

As stated on the Conference’s website: “In light of the current Federal Government’s commitment to social participation, a new Council for the Rights of LGBTQIA+ People was established by Decree No. 11,471, dated April 6, 2023 — the previous Council had been abolished by decree during the government of Jair Bolsonaro. Likewise — also as an expression of this commitment — the Federal Government convened the 4th National Conference on the Rights of LGBTQIA+ People by Decree No. 11,848, dated December 26, 2023, under the motto ‘Building the National Policy on the Rights of LGBTQIA+ People.'”

On the issue of gender-based violence, the government launched the national mobilization “Femicídio Zero” in August 2024, with cumulative investments of R$ 389 million since 2023 for protection shelters and care services for women in situations of violence. In October 2024, Lula enacted a law that raised the penalty for femicide to a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 40 years in prison, established femicide as a specific offense with its own article to facilitate statistical identification, and incorporated important aggravating circumstances, including disqualification from holding public office for those convicted of serious crimes against women. In February 2025, the Supreme Federal Court extended the urgent protective measures of the Maria da Penha Law — named in honor of Maria da Penha Fernandes, the woman who sought justice for two attempted murders at the hands of her partner — to travesti and transsexual women.

In December 2024, Lula enacted the National Care Policy — developed by more than 20 ministries and approved almost unanimously in Congress — the first normative framework in Brazil to recognize care as a human right and establish co-responsibility among the State, the market, families, and communities. That same month, the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CONANDA) approved Resolution 258/2024, establishing humanized care protocols for girls and adolescents who are victims of sexual violence, guaranteeing their access to legal abortion. In March 2025, a São Paulo court issued an unprecedented ruling recognizing “stealthing” — the removal of a condom without consent — as sexual violence analogous to rape, enabling access to legal abortion in such cases.

The Supreme Federal Court: a key actor in the defense of rights

The STF acted during the period as a significant defensive actor against attempts at regression. In June 2024, it unanimously affirmed that trans people have access to all treatments available through the Unified Health System (SUS), making binding a ruling that had been issued in 2021. That same month, the full bench of the STF decided, within the framework of Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 5668, that public and private schools are obligated to combat discrimination based on gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation, including sexist and homo-lesbo-transphobic bullying. STF Justice Alexandre de Moraes also suspended the resolution of the Federal Council of Medicine that sought to restrict legal abortion in cases of rape beyond 22 weeks of pregnancy.

Setbacks and threats from Congress and the medical establishment

Against this backdrop of advances, the Bolsonarist opposition and conservative sectors of the institutional system sought to generate setbacks and threats. On June 12, 2024, the Chamber of Deputies approved — under an urgency procedure, in a session lasting just 23 seconds — Bill 1904/2024, which equated abortion from week 22 onwards with simple homicide, with penalties of up to 20 years in prison, even in cases of pregnancies resulting from rape. The bill was never implemented: the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association declared it unconstitutional by acclamation, and the social mobilization was immediate and massive. In December 2024, CONANDA Resolution 258/2024 on legal abortion for child rape victims was suspended by order of a federal judge at the request of Senator Damares Alves — a former Bolsonaro minister — although the suspension was judicially reversed in January 2025.

In the area of trans rights, the Federal Council of Medicine approved a resolution in April 2025 prohibiting the use of puberty blockers and hormone therapies for minors under 18, and establishing that gender-affirming surgeries may only be performed from age 21 onwards — a measure that runs in diametrically opposite direction to international standards in trans healthcare, and which comes from a corporate actor with normative power over medical practice. In June 2025, two bills introduced in the Senate sought to reserve bathrooms exclusively for cisgender women and restrict the participation of trans people in women’s sports, part of a broader trend: in the first half of 2025, the Senate accumulated five anti-LGBTQIA+ bills.

Civil society resistance

The response of civil society was active and articulate. In June 2024, mass demonstrations took place in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and other cities against Bill 1904/2024. On June 15, thousands of people protested in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília under the banner of rejecting the equation of abortion with homicide. In March 2025, thousands of women marched in the country’s main cities on International Women’s Day, against femicide, for the decriminalization of abortion, and for more resources for gender policies, in a context of record femicide figures in 2024.

As relevant context, an official report from August 2024 on the eighteen years of the Maria da Penha Law noted that legislative advances have not been able to reverse the increase in violence. In 2023, assaults against women in the country increased by 9.8%, reaching 258,941 reported cases. The number of women threatened grew by 16.5%, with 778,921 cases recorded, while incidents of psychological violence surged by 33.8%, totaling 38,507 cases. This gap between the normative framework and the reality experienced by women is an important indicator of the limits of institutional progress.

General overview

The area of labor rights in Brazil shows a predominantly positive balance in terms of measures taken by the federal executive, offset by the judicial confirmation of the labor reform enacted in 2017 and by threats linked to the precarization of work. The period also records a notable level of trade union activity, with strikes, mobilizations, and legislative proposals that placed the labor agenda at the center of public debate.

Executive advances: labor protection and the fight against slave labor

The Lula government recorded several concrete advances in labor rights during the period. In June 2024, the Ministry of Education reached an agreement with university teacher unions — ANDES-SN and SINASEFE — that ended a 70-day strike: the agreement provides for a restructuring of the pay scale and salary increases. In September 2024, Lula signed a decree establishing new labor protection rules for the 73,000 outsourced workers in federal government agencies, aligned with ILO standards, with a maximum working week of 40 hours and an obligation to respect the category minimum wage in public tenders. Also in September 2024, the Ministries of Labor, Human Rights, and Justice published an administrative order reaffirming the commitment against labor rights violations, through the regular publication of the list of employers with slave labor complaints. In October 2024, the government launched the “Acredita no Primeiro Passo” program for the socioeconomic inclusion of low-income families. Meanwhile, Operação Resgate IV, carried out between July and August 2024, rescued 593 workers subjected to conditions analogous to slavery across 11 states — 11.65% more than the previous year’s operation. The contextual data is significant: agriculture, civil construction, and services were the sectors with the highest incidence, with Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Pernambuco recording the most cases.

Setbacks and threats: the persistence of the 2017 reform and labor precarization

In November 2024, the Superior Labor Court confirmed that the labor reform approved in 2017 under the Temer government would also apply to employment contracts predating that law, depriving workers of benefits such as payment for commuting time that had been eliminated by the reform. This judicial ruling consolidated setbacks that the Lula government has not been able to reverse legislatively. In June 2024, the STF analyzed the constitutionality of the intermittent work contract — which allows payment only for hours actually worked — with a vote going 3 to 2 in favor of maintaining it. In December 2024, Lula enacted a law capping the increase of the minimum wage at 2.5% above inflation until 2030, a measure that, while aimed at providing fiscal predictability, was criticized by trade union federations as a ceiling that could erode purchasing power over the long term.

Trade union resistance and the 6×1 working hours agenda

The period recorded trade union activity of notable scale. In July 2024, employees of the National Social Security Institute (INSS) — the Brazilian federal body responsible for administering and paying social security — went on an indefinite strike demanding salary adjustments and career recognition. In August 2024, postal workers launched a strike with wage demands. In October 2024, SINASEFE — the national union representing teaching staff and technical-administrative personnel of the Federal Network of Professional, Scientific, and Technological Education — held a 48-hour national work stoppage demanding compliance with previous salary agreements. In November 2024, large-scale mobilizations across the country placed the 6×1 working schedule at the center of debate — the regime of 6 consecutive working days with 1 day of rest, implying up to 44 hours per week, which particularly affects workers in commerce, services, and healthcare.

In response to these mobilizations, in February 2025 Representative Erika Hilton (PSOL-SP) introduced Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) No. 8/2025 to eliminate the 6×1 schedule, establish a maximum 36-hour working week, and institute a 4-day work week. The proposal was filed with 234 lawmakers’ signatures and nearly 3 million citizens’ signatures. In March 2025, gig workers in several cities halted activities for two days demanding a minimum rate of R$ 10 per delivery. On May 1, 2025, the trade union federations delivered to President Lula the “Workers’ Class Agenda 2025,” with demands including the regulation of app-based work, reduction of working hours without salary reduction, restoration of retirees’ purchasing power, and the end of the 6×1 schedule.

General overview

The area of racism and xenophobia in Brazil exhibits, as with the previous areas, a tension between the progressive advances pursued by the federal executive and the persistence of structural phenomena of discrimination and violence. The Lula government reactivated the demarcation of indigenous lands — entirely halted during the Bolsonaro government — and promoted a national migration policy through democratic debate and participatory construction. But at the same time, violence against indigenous peoples worsened under the legal framework created by restrictive legislation, and religious intolerance — especially against African-derived religions — reached record levels.

Indigenous lands: demarcations and structural violence

The Lula government recognized the territorial rights of Brazilian indigenous peoples over five new lands during the analyzed period: Aldeia Velha (Bahia) and Cacique Fontoura (Mato Grosso) in April 2024; Potiguara de Monte-Mor (Paraíba), Morro dos Cavalos, and Toldo Imbu (Santa Catarina) in December 2024, bringing the total to 13 territories demarcated since the beginning of his third term. Many of these recognition orders dated back to 2007 and 2008 without ever having been executed. The government also reactivated the National Council of Indigenous Policy (CNPI), which had been dismantled during the Bolsonaro administration.

However, these advances coexist with a picture of structural violence worsened by Law 14,701/2023, which establishes that indigenous peoples only have rights over lands that were in their possession at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution in October 1988. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN warned in July 2024 about growing violence against indigenous peoples in Bahia, Paraná, and Mato Grosso do Sul, in the context of the legal uncertainty generated by this law. In August 2024, the Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB) withdrew from the STF’s Conciliation Chamber, denouncing it as “forced conciliation” over fundamental rights. The 20th edition of the Acampamento Terra Livre, held in June 2024 in Brasília under the motto “Indigenous Emergency: Our Rights Are Non-Negotiable,” brought together thousands of indigenous people in a massive demonstration along the Esplanada dos Ministérios.

Religious intolerance: a growing phenomenon

As relevant contextual data, the records of Disque 100 — a service for disseminating information on the rights of vulnerable groups and for reporting human rights violations — for 2024 show a picture of growing religious intolerance: 2,472 violations due to religious intolerance, representing an increase of 990 cases compared to 2023. African-derived religions — umbanda and candomblé — were the most targeted, with attacks on religious centers (terreiros), assaults during rituals, and hate graffiti. In the Federal District, 50% of recorded religious intolerance crimes were directed against these religions; the Respeite Meu Terreiro report found that 76% of terreiros had suffered some form of attack that can be interpreted as religious racism. This phenomenon reveals the persistence of discriminatory practices with deep historical roots that government policies have not been able to reverse.

Migrants: between participatory policy and xenophobia

In the area of migration, the Lula government promoted between 2023 and 2024 a participatory process for the construction of the National Policy on Migration, Refuge, and Statelessness (COMIGRAR), which culminated in November 2024 with a national conference that produced 60 priority public policy proposals, with the participation of 14,000 people including migrants, civil society organizations, and international bodies. The National Committee for Refugees (CONARE) also recognized 13,409 asylum applications through October 2024, expedited through the use of artificial intelligence. As contextual data, the regional report by the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) (2025) identified that defenders of migrants’ rights face threats, stigmatization, and xenophobia in Brazil, with an exponential increase of 874% in xenophobia cases between 2021 and 2022, a trend that continued during the monitored period.

Police violence: the structural context of repression

Two situations recorded in our database provide elements for understanding a context of structural racism in Brazil. Police lethality in the Baixada Santista increased by 71% in the first half of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, as a result of Operações Escudo and Verão. In the Conjunto de Favelas da Maré (Rio de Janeiro), 37 police operations in 2024 left three dead, more than 30 raids, and affected the right to free movement of 140,000 people. The UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, who visited Brazil in August 2024, noted that police violence in favelas is directly linked to structural racism. The 2024 Brazilian Public Security Yearbook revealed that 82% of deaths from police intervention involved Black people, who are 4 times more likely to die at the hands of the police than a white person. These data constitute a pattern of racialized state violence that federal government policies have not been able to halt, and which represents one of the most serious human rights deficits of the period in Brazil.